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NOTE
TORTS-Immunity-The Good Samaritan Statute. Wis.
Stat. § 895.48 (1977). In June 1963, the Wisconsin Legislature
enacted a good samaritan statute' which granted immunity
from civil liability to physicians and nurses who, in good faith,
rendered care at the scene of an emergency.2 In November 1977,
the legislature enacted chapter 164 of the Laws of 1977 which
extended this grant of immunity to any person rendering emer-
gency care in good faith at the scene of an emergency or acci-
dent.3 While in 1962 at least twenty-three other states had
passed similar statutes,4 by 1977 all fifty states and the District
of Columbia had adopted some form of good samaritan legisla-
tion.5 Such widespread acceptance of the need for this type of
legislation suggests the magnitude of the problem.
1. 1963 Wis. Laws ch. 94. For a general discussion of Wisconsin's first good samari-
tan statute, enacted in 1963, see Comment, Wisconsin's "Good Samaritan" Statute,
48 MARQ. L. REV. 80 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
2. 1963 Wis. Laws ch. 94 provides in full:
AN ACT to create 147.17(7) and 149.06(5) of the statutes, relating to exempting
doctors and nurses from civil liability for emergency treatment at the scene of
the emergency.
SEcTION 1. 147.17(7) of the statutes is created to read:
147.17(7) No person licensed under this section, who in good faith renders
emergency care at the scene of an emergency, is liable for any civil damages as
a result of acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.
For the purpose of this subsection, the scene of an emergency shall be those
areas not within the confines of a hospital or other institution which has hospital
facilities, or a physician's office.
SECTION 2. 149.06(5) of the statutes is created to read:
149.06(5) No person registered under this section, who in good faith renders
emergency care at the scene of an emergency, is liable for any civil damages as
a result of acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.
For the purpose of this subsection, the scene of an emergency shall be those
areas not within the confines of a hospital or other institution which has hospital
facilities, or a physician's office.
3. 1977 Wis. Laws ch. 164 created § 895.48. See text accompanying note 14 infra.
4. Comment, supra note 1, at 80.
5. Wisconsin became the thirty-third jurisdiction to grant immunity from liability
to all citizens. The remaining eighteen jurisdictions protect only physicians, nurses or
physicians and nurses and other licensed personnel including emergency medical tech-
nicians, ambulance attendants, policemen and firemen. Those statutes which protect
all individuals rendering aid in an emergency now include: ALAS. STAT. § 09.65.090
(Supp. 1978); ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1471 (Supp. 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 72-624
(Supp. 1977); CoLo. RV. STAT. § 13-21-108 (Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §
6801 (Supp. 1978); D.C. CODE ANN. § 2-142 (Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.13
(West Supp. 1978); GA. CODE ANN. § 54-930 (1975); HAw. lIv. STAT. § 663-1.5 (Supp.
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COMMON-LAW BACKGROUND OF THE GOOD SAMARITAN PROBLEM
Good samaritan statutes were enacted in response to what
appeared to be negative policy implications of a strict applica-
tion of the common law in situations involving a person in peril
and a bystander. The common law does not recognize a moral
obligation to aid another in peril as an affirmative legal duty,'
and courts therefore generally refuse to impose liability for non-
feasance in such situations. However, should one who owes no
duty nevertheless undertake to act for the benefit of a victim,
a duty of due care arises upon which subsequent liability can
be predicated.7 It was thought that it was this potential liabil-
ity for misfeasance that deterred many from rendering assis-
tance in emergency situations. Good samaritan legislation then
is an attempt to encourage lay persons and professionals to
respond to another's need for help by granting limited immun-
ity for negligent acts which might occur while rendering emer-
gency assistance.8 The omnibus wording of the current Wiscon-
1975); IDAHO CODE § 5-330 (Supp. 1978); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12-1 (Burns 1973); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 613.17 (West Supp. 1978); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 164 (Supp. 1978);
MD. HEALTH CODE ANN. § 43-132 (Supp. 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.05 (West Supp.
1978); NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.500 (1975); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 508.12 (Supp. 1975);
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:62A-1 (West Supp. 1978); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-25-3, -4 (1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-166(d) (1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. tit. 23, § 2305.23 (Page Supp.
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5 (West 1976); S.C. CODE § 46-803 (Supp. 1975); S.D.
COMPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 20-9-3, -4, -4.1 (Supp. 1978); TENN. CODE ANN. § 63-622 (Supp.
1978); TEx. Civ. STAT. ANN. art, la (Vernon Supp. 1978); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519
(1973); VA. CODE § 54-276.9 (1978); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.300 (Supp. 1977);
W. VA. CODE § 55-7-15 (Supp. 1978); Wis. STAT. § 895.48 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 33-343.1
(Supp. 1975).
Those statutes which protect only physicians, nurses and other medically trained
personnel include: ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 121(1) (Supp. 1973); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §
2144 (West Supp. 1979); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557b (West Supp. 1978); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 91, § 2a (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-2891 (Vernon
Supp. 1978); Ky. REV. STAT. § 411.148 (Supp. 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37:1731-
32 (West 1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 112, § 12B (West 1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 691.1501 (1968); MISS. CODE ANN. § 73-25-37 (Supp. 1978); Mo. ANN. STAT. §
190.195 (Vernon Supp. 1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-410 (1967); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1152 (1975); N.Y. EDUc. LAW § 6527(2) (McKinney 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§
43-17-37, -38 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.800 (1977); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1641-43
(Purdon Supp. 1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 5-31-26, 5-34-38, 5-37-14 (Supp. 1979); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 58-12-23, -39 (1953).
6. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 56, at 340-41 (4th ed. 1971)
[hereinafter cited as PROSSER]. See also Gregory, Gratuitous Undertakings and the
Duty of Care, 1 DE PAUL L. REV. 30 (1951).
7. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 323 -24 (1965). PROSSER, supra note 6, at 343.
8. The first good samaritan statute passed by California in 1959 was apparently
catalyzed by the callous refusal of several available physicians to aid an injured skier
[Vol. 62:469
TORTS-IMMUNITY
sin good samaritan statute results from the legislature's deter-
mination that abrogation of potential tort liability for both
professionals and lay persons would encourage more individu-
als to voluntarily assist others
CRITICISM OF GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES
From their inception good samaritan statutes have been
criticized as being unnecessary,'0 unfair" and unconstitu-
tional. 2 The paucity of reported cases at the appellate level
dealing with good samaritan statutes, however, indicates that
many of those concerns were premature.' 3 Nevertheless, in light
of the limited judicial interpretation of these statutes, the lack
of uniformity among them, their imprecise language and their
sparse legislative histories, serious questions remain regarding
the outer limits of the statutes' protection and the circumstan-
ces under which their protection is provided. Inasmuch as the
good samaritan statutes are an important response to a wide-
spread concern for the insular nature of modern society, it is
lying on a ski slope. See 51 CAUIF. L. REv. 816, 818 (1963); 64 COLuM. L. REv. 1301
(1964); 42 OR. L. REv. 328 (1963).
9. See letter on file with Marquette Law Review from J.F. Rooney, Representative
and principal author of Assembly Bill 96, to author (Aug. 23, 1978) [hereinafter cited
as Rooney] which reads in part:
In answer to your first question as to why we expanded the scope of the original
good samaritan statutes; it was felt that our society has become "sue happy"
and therefore many citizens who might otherwise go to the aid of a fellow human
being do not because of the fear of being sued for trying to help. By elimination
of the threat of lawsuit, more people would be apt to aid a victim. It was also
felt that anyone compassionate enough to go to someone's aid in an emergency
should not have to face financial ruin from a future lawsuit, as long as they act
in good faith.
10. Comment, Malpractice Immunity for the Physician: Unconstitutional, Unfair,
Unnecessary, 3 DUQ. U. L. REV. 83, 89 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Malpractice
Immunity]; 44 N.C.L. REv. 508, 510 (1966); 1964 Wis. L. REv. 494, 497-98.
11. Malpractice Immunity, supra note 10, at 87.
12. Id.; Comment, supra note 1, at 83; 64 CoLum. L. REv. 1301, 1312 (1964); 41 NEB.
L. REv. 609 (1962); 44 N.C.L. REv. 508 (1966).
13. Only two cases have reached appellate courts: In Lee v. State, 490 P.2d 1206
(Alas. 1971), the Alaska Supreme Court held that their good samaritan statute was
inapplicable where a duty to rescue existed prior to a rescue attempt. Here a state
trooper accidently shot a person he was attempting to rescue from a lion. The court
found that an obligation arose out of the customary role played by police officers in
an emergency whereas the good samaritan statutes were meant to apply to persons not
under any pre-existing duty to rescue. The second case is Dahl v. Turner, 80 N.M. 564,
458 P.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458 P.2d 860 (1969); see text
accompanying notes 36-37 infra. No case has been found wherein a person was sued
for rendering first aid.
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crucial that such statutes be worded as precisely as possible to
insure their maximum effect.
CONSTRUCTION OF WISCONSIN'S GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTE
Wisconsin's statute is fairly typical of the majority of good
samaritan statutes:
Any person who renders emergency care at the scene of any
emergency or accident in good faith shall be immune from
civil liability for his or her acts or omissions in rendering such
emergency care. This immunity does not extend when em-
ployes trained in health care or health care professionals ren-
der emergency care for compensation and within the scope of
their usual and customary employment or practice at a hospi-
tal or other institution equipped with hospital facilities, at
the scene of any emergency or accident, enroute to a hospital
or other institution equipped with hospital facilities or at a
physician's office."
The primary effect of the change in wording in the first sent-
ence was to extend the class of protected individuals to include
all persons who render aid. The second sentence, requiring that
an individual be "off duty" to be covered by the statute is new
and applies primarily to skilled health care professionals,
trained emergency medical technicians and ambulance attend-
ants. It was inserted pursuant to a legislative policy that health
care professionals should not be immune from liability for neg-
ligence while being compensated for their services.'5
14. Wis. STAT. § 895.48 (1977).
15. See Wisconsin Legislative Council Staff Memorandum by Dan Fernbach, Sen-
ior Staff Attorney (Aug. 31, 1977) [hereinafter cited as Fernbach] on file with Mar-
quette Law Review. Discussing the earlier version of the good samaritan statute,
Mr. Fernbach noted that:
Despite the limited scope of Wisconsin's present "Good Samaritan" statutes,
Wisconsin law is consistent with prevailing policy that specially-trained health
care professionals should not be immune from civil liability for on-the-job acts
and omissions within their scope of employment or regular professional duties.
In other words, statutory "Good Samaritan" immunity should apply only to off-
duty gratuitous emergency care rendered in good faith.
Id. (emphasis added). Later when discussing the proposed legislation, he indicated
that:
It would appear that original Assembly Bill 96 was intended to reflect the
prevailing policy that skilled health care professionals, such as doctors and
nurses, should be held to a higher standard of care commensurate with their
specialized training when rendering emergency care or treatment in the normal
course of their duties.
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The sole qualification in Wisconsin's statute is that the
intervenor act in "good faith." However, the statute's failure
to further define good faith raises significant problems. Be-
cause good faith may be interpreted as either a subjective state
of mind or an objective standard of behavior, the statute pre-
sents an ambiguous inducement to render emergency care."
Only one state, Pennsylvania, has included a definition of
good faith in its good samaritan statute and, unfortunately,
even this definition raises a subjective question of fact.17 More-
over, in Wisconsin, case law fails to clarify what is meant by
the phrase "good faith." In one case, acts not characterized by
"recklessness or heartlessness" have been held to be in good
faith. 8 In another, 9 the court indicated that good faith was a
term that "prescribes a general course of conduct,"20 and fur-
ther noted that, "Whether an individual acted in good faith is
a question that can only be answered following a careful analy-
sis of the facts in a particular case."'" This interpretation raises
serious factual issues which effectively eliminate any objective
criteria by which the character of one's acts may be judged.
A majority of jurisdictions have added a second qualifica-
tion to their good samaritan statutes to lessen the confusion
surrounding the good faith standard. These statutes grant
immunity for all good faith conduct which falls short of "gross
negligence" or "willful or wanton misconduct. '2 Inasmuch as
16. See Rooney, supra note 9.
Although there is no definition for good faith it is the intent of the law that a
person should try to use common sense and judgment in aiding a victim at an
emergency and as long as they do not act cruelly or with malice, in most cases
they will be exempt from liability.
Id. (emphasis added).
17. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1642 (Purdon Supp. 1978):" 'Good faith' shall include,
but is not limited to, a reasonable opinion that the immediacy of the situation is such
that the rendering of care should not be postponed until the patient is hospitalized."
18. Wilde v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light, 147 Wis. 129, 132, 132 N.W. 885, 886
(1911).
19. Williams v. Hoffman, 66 Wis. 2d 145, 223 N.W.2d 844 (1974).
20. Id. at 153, 223 N.W.2d at 848.
21. Id. The court in Williams relied on Baker v. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co., 26
Wis. 2d 306, 315, 132 N.W.2d 493, 498 (1965), wherein it was stated that while negli-
gence was not per se bad faith conduct, "The extent and character of the negligence,
however, are factors to be considered by the trier of fact in weighing the matter of bad
faith."
22. Gross negligence is generally defined as less than reckless disregard for conse-
quences and differs from ordinary negligence in degree, not kind. PRosszR, supra note
6, § 34, at 183. See also Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d, 1, 14-16, 114 N.W.2d 105, 111-
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the common-law standard of care in an emergency is that of a
reasonable person under the same or similar emergency cir-
cumstances,23 it is arguable that tort liability for negligent as-
sistance rendered in an emergency situation is limited by this
more definite standard. However, Wisconsin's good samaritan
statute lacks any such language clarifying the required stan-
dard of care.
The problem is further compounded by the fact that while
the statute broadly covers "any person" who renders care, it
fails to distinguish between skilled individuals and untrained
persons. The legislature did not make clear whether all persons
will be held to the same standard, i.e. a reasonable person
acting in good faith under the same or similar circumstances,
or whether those with specialized knowledge and skills will be
held to a standard which reflects the good faith utilization and
application of the particular skills which they possess. In none-
mergency situations, the Wisconsin court has stated that,
"Experience, competence and specialized knowledge of the
profession and its standards are certainly helpful in determin-
ing whether a failure to exercise care was grossly negligent. '2 4
It would seem then that even in the emergency situation the
particular skills and knowledge of the person rendering assis-
tance is clearly a consideration in determining whether good
faith is present and if the standard of care has been met. State-
ments by legislators involved in the recent amendments also
indicate that skilled individuals will continue to be held to a
standard of care reflecting their training. The first draft of
Assembly Bill 96 included a professional competence standard
which created a general immunity applicable to all persons
13 (1962). Willful, wanton or reckless conduct usually indicates an intention on the
part of an actor to intentionally do an unreasonable act in disregard of a known risk
or one which is so obvious that it should have been known. PRossER, supra note 6, §
34, at 185. It should be noted that Bielski abolished the concept of gross negligence in
Wisconsin.
Those jurisdictions which include the qualification of gross negligence and/or will-
ful or wanton conduct in their good samaritan statutes include: Alaska, Arizona,
California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
23. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 296 (1965).




who rendered "emergency care . . . in good faith and within
the range of the person's professional competence. ... "1 The
language emphasized in the preceding sentence was subse-
quently deleted in the compromise version of the bill but As-
sembly Substitute Amendment 1 to Assembly Bill 96 included
the following language:
This section shall not be construed as absolving from civil
liability any person whose emergency care acts or omissions
amount to a high degree of negligence when compared with
the emergency care which such person could reasonably have
been expected to exercise even under the adverse conditions
of the emergency or accident."
Both statements, although dropped from the bill, can be seen
as legislative consideration of the need to establish a more
meaningful definition of the standard of care, as well as indi-
cating an intent to base that standard on the level of knowledge
and skill which an individual brings to the emergency situa-
tionY
25. Wis. A.B. 96 (1977 Sess.) (emphasis added). The complete section reads as
follows:
895.48 CIVIL LIABILITY EXEMPTION: EMERGENCY CARE. Any per-
son who renders emergency care at the scene of any emergency or accident in
good faith and within the range of the person's professional competence shall
be immune from civil liability for his or her acts or ommissions in rendering such
emergency care. This immunity does not extend when persons trained in health
care render emergency care in the normal course of their duties at a hospital,
institution equipped with hospital facilities, or physician's office.
Id. § 3.
26. Assembly Substitute Amendment 1 to Wis. A.B. 96 (1977 Sess.) reads as fol-
lows:
895.48 CIVIL LIABILITY EXEMPTION: EMERGENCY CARE. Any per-
son who renders emergency care in good faith at the scene of any emergency or
accident shall be immune from civil liability for acts or omissions in rendering
such emergency care. Such immunity does not extend when persons trained in
health care render emergency care in the normal course of their duties at a
hospital, institution equipped with hospital facilities or physician's office. This
section shall not be construed as absolving from civil liability any person whose
emergency care acts or omissions amount to a high degree of negligence when
compared with the emergency care which such person could reasonably have
been expected to exercise even under the adverse conditions of the emergency
or accident.
27. See letter on file with the Marquette Law Review from Tommy G. Thompson,
Representative, to author (Sept. 27, 1978) which reads in part:
With regard to the standards of professional competence, the legislators did not
want to pin down definitions to a particular standard-especially since it is the
general public that is now able to render aid and it would be assumed that
people would be expected to use good common sense in giving this aid. One
1979]
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Coupled with the fact that recent case law may indicate
that there is a duty on the part of a person possessing special-
ized knowledge to use it if he once acts,"8 the standard of care
for trained individuals will most likely continue to be that de-
gree of care, skill and judgment usually exercised under similar
emergency circumstances by an average practitioner in the
same field. In sum, the immunity granted by the current good
samaritan statute appears to be severely conditioned since the
intervenor can still be brought to trial before a jury and the jury
will decide liability on the basis of a vague and ambiguous
standard of good faith. The failure of the legislature to clearly
articulate the standard of care to which individuals will be held
endangers the effectiveness and the purpose of the good samar-
itan statute. A more definite standard of care would have clari-
fied the actual scope of the immunity and may have provided
a greater incentive to render assistance in emergency situa-
tions.
Similar definitional problems are encountered in relation to
the terms "emergency care" and "emergency." Since the legis-
lature has failed to promulgate specific definitions for these
terms, the determination of an emergency or emergency care
is also controlled by the ambiguous standard of good faith.
Given the large number of persons who potentially fall within
cannot really define "competence" for persons, who by their own volition are
giving aid, when they may not have a particular medical training by which they
can be judged.
28. Nimmer v. Purtell, 69 Wis. 2d 21, 230 N.W.2d 258 (1975). In this case Dr.
Nimmer was held to the standard of care usually exercised under the same or similar
circumstances by the average osteopathic physician in his medical treatment of him-
self and was found to be contributorily negligent in causing his own injuries when he
failed to adhere to that standard. The court noted that,
A doctor who undertakes to treat himself, either alone or in conjunction with
another or directs another in his treatment or makes his own diagnosis and
directs another to treat him accordingly, when it comes to a question of contri-
butory negligence in the joint treatment, can be as guilty of 'malpractice' as he
can be in treating another.
Id. at 31-32, 230 N.W.2d at 264.
The court then quoted the trial court:
"It isn't a case where Dr. Nimmer placed himself solely and with confidence
under the care of Dr. Purtell. . . .It is a case where two men were treating
Nimmer, Purtell and Nimmer. . ..
It would be in my opinion a gross misadministration of justice to tell a jury
that Dr. Nimmer under the peculiar evidence of this case had only a duty to
exercise the same degree of care and skill that a steel worker or a baker might
exercise."
Id. at 32 n.2, 230 N.W.2d at 264 n.2.
[Vol. 62:469
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the scope of the statute, the circumstances under which they
will be protected should be clarified.
Only two states have taken the precaution of defining
"emergency care" within their good samaritan statutes. 29 The
Oklahoma statute is of particular 'interest because it delineates
and limits the type of emergency care which a lay person can
provide, i.e. artificial respiration, prevention of blood loss, res-
toration of heart action or blood circulation. 3 In light of the
potential for aggravation of a serious injury by unknowing and
erroneous action on the part of untrained individuals, emer-
gency care for injuries should be statutorily delineated and
limited to only those resuscitative measures necessary to sus-
tain life.
Because the Wisconsin good samaritan statute also condi-
tions its grant of immunity on the existence of an emergency,
only acts done in an emergency situation are protected. There-
fore, a more complete definition of the "scene of emergency"
should be formulated. 3 The seriousness of injuries suffered as
a consideration in defining the term "emergency" has only
been recognized by Oregon which conditions any emergency
aid upon the existence of a life-threatening situation.32 New
Mexico, on the other hand, characterizes an emergency in
29. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 76, § 5(2) (West 1976):
Where no prior contractual relationship exists, any person who in good faith
renders or attempts to render emergency care consisting of artificial respiration,
or preventing or retarding the loss of blood, or aiding or restoring heart action
or circulation of blood to the victim or victims of an accident or emergency,
wherever required, shall not be liable for any civil damages as a result of any
acts or omissions by such person in rendering the emergency care.
ALAs. STAT. § 09.65.090 (Supp. 1978) (emphasis added):
A person at a hospital or any other location who renders emergency care or
emergency counseling to an injured, ill, or emotionally distraught person who
reasonably appears to the person rendering the aid to be in immediate need of
emergency aid in order to avoid serious harm or death is not liable for civil
damages as a result of an act or omission in rendering emergency aid.
30. See note 29 supra.
31. See Wis. STAT. § 448.03(4) (1977).
32. OR. REv. STAT. § 30.800(a) (1977) (emphasis added):
"Emergency medical assistance" means medical care not provided in a place
where emergency medical care is regularly available, including but not limited
to a hospital, industrial first aid station or a physicians office, given voluntarily
and without the expectation of compensation to an injured person who is in need
of immediate medical care and under emergency circumstances that suggest




terms of the physical causes of the injury requiring care.,
Given the lack of definition in most statutes, courts will be
required to turn to case law. Case law defining an emergency
usually deals with situations outside this statutory context and
focuses on the unexpected or sudden nature of the incident and
the necessity of immediate action.3 4 The Wisconsin court, for
example, employs the term to refer to an unforseen combina-
tion of circumstances. 5
The case of Dahl v. Turner3 clearly points out the need for
legislatures to promulgate specific guidelines within good sa-
maritan statutes. In this case, the defendant stopped at the
scene of an accident and attempted to aid the plaintiff who
appeared confused, but had suffered only minimal physical
injuries and refused to go to a doctor. The defendant then
undertook to drive the plaintiff to a friend's motel. En route
defendant was involved in an automobile accident in which
plaintiff suffered additional personal injuries. In a subsequent
suit arising out of this automobile accident, the court refused
to submit a good samaritan instruction to the jury stating that
while the defendant may have been administering care in pro-
viding transportation, such care did not fall within the mean-
ing of "emergency care." The court noted that its decision was
based upon the lack of facts indicating a "pressing necessity for
such transportation" and a failure to show that the transporta-
tion was "immediately called for. '3 7
In light of the above, and without questioning the wisdom
of departing from the common-law standard of due care con-
templated by the current Wisconsin good samaritan statute, it
appears that the circumstances under which the immunity will
apply should be delineated more carefully.
33. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-25-4 (1976) defines emergency as an "unexpected occur-
rence involving injury or illness to persons, including motor vehicle accidents and
collisions, disasters, and other accidents and events of a similar nature occurring in
public or private places."
34. See, e.g., Hercules Powder Co. v. Crawford, 163 F.2d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 1947);
Oakes v. Peter Pan Bakers Inc., 258 Iowa 447, -, 138 N.W.2d 93, 100 (1965);
Mansfield Gen. Hosp. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 170 Ohio 486, -, 166 N.E.2d
224, 226 (1960); Goolsbee v. Texas & N.O.R., 150 Tex. 528, -, 243 S.W.2d 386, 388
(1951); Pickett v. Cooper, 202 Va. 60, -, 116 S.E.2d 48, 51 (1960).
35. Kaestner v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 254 Wis. 12, 16, 35 N.W.2d 190, 192
(1948).
36. 80 N.M. 564, 458 P.2d 816 (Ct. App. 1969), cert. denied, 80 N.M. 608, 458 P.2d
860 (1969).
37. Id. at -, 458 P.2d at 824.
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A further problem with the statute is its failure to address
the question of liability in cases of abandonment. The render-
ing of emergency care can be life threatening in some instances
when treatment is begun but not completed, and legislative
consideration should be given to withdrawing the immunity in
situations where this type of malfeasance compounds the vic-
tim's injuries.
The last aspect of Wisconsin's statute that merits discus-
sion is the "off duty" nature of the emergency care contem-
plated by the statute. The immunity from liability which is
granted does not extend to individuals who "render emergency
care for compensation and within the scope of their usual and
customary employment. '3 While several states require that
the care rendered be gratuitous or not pursuant to a pre-
existing physician-patient contract before immunity will at-
tach,39 the Wisconsin statute does not contemplate such a re-
striction 0 Rather, the legislature, in enacting this language,
was sensitive to the fact that individuals such as ambulance
attendants, emergency medical technicians and paramedics
often devote their time and skills without remuneration and
sought to protect such individuals from liability for their ef-
forts."
38. Wis. STAT. § 895.48 (1977).
39. See, e.g., the good samaritan statutes in Arizona, Connecticut, Hawaii, New
Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, West
Virginia, Wyoming, supra note 5.
40. Presumably, then, a physician could bill for any services rendered at the scene
of an emergency or accident.
41. See Fembach, supra note 15, which reads in part:
It would appear that original Assembly Bill 96 was intended to reflect the
prevailing policy that skilled health care professionals, such as doctors and
nurses, should be held to a higher standard of care commensurate with their
specialized training when rendering emergency care or treatment in the normal
course of their duties. However, by limiting the immunity exception only to
trained personnel rendering emergency care "at a hospital, institution equipped
with hospital facilities, or physician's office," the Assembly adopted a bill which
granted full on-the-job civil immunity to certain skilled health care profession-
als (paramedics and ambulance attendants) who are trained to render emer-
gency care "at the scene of an emergency or accident" and "enroute to a hospital
or other institution equipped with hospital facilities."
Apparently, the Assembly was reluctant to exclude trained paramedics and
ambulance attendants from the general "Good Samaritan" immunity created
under Assembly Bill 96 because some of these services are performed by
"volunteer" rescue squads and fire departments. Since the members of these
organizations donate their time and services to the public without compensa-




While the statute as enacted fulfills this purpose, the legis-
lature failed to consider prior legislation 2 and administrative
rules of the Department of Health and Social Services4 3 requir-
ing municipalities and other health care providers employing
ambulance attendants and emergency medical technicians to
maintain liability insurance to protect employees and volun-
teers from "civil liability resulting from the good faith perform-
ance of duties."" Since the responsibility for carrying such lia-
bility insurance also extends to volunteer service providers, the
good samaritan immunity for volunteers effectively denies a
legal remedy to those who might be injured by the negligent
acts of an on-duty volunteer. This creates an anomalous situa-
tion wherein one injured by the negligence of a paramedic com-
pensated for his services can recover in damages for injuries
suffered, while one injured by the negligent acts of a volunteer
is denied such recovery although the volunteer is protected by
liability insurance required by statute. Without raising the
constitutional arguments regarding good samaritan legislation
in general," it must be noted that such a provision selectively
abrogates the right to sue for professional malpractice and may
contravene article I, section 9 of the Wisconsin Constitution,46
42. Wis. STAT. § 146.35(11) (1975):
LIAILrry INSURANCE. The department shall, as a condition to the approval of any
emergency medical services program under sub. (3), require adequate liability
insurance sufficient to protect all emergency medical technicians-advanced
(paramedics) and physicians from civil liability resulting from the good faith
performance of duties authorized under this section.
43. Wls. AD. CODE § H21.04:
The department, as a condition, to the approval of an emergency medical serv-
ices plan, shall require:
(1) Adequate liability insurance sufficient to protect all emergency medical
technicians-advanced (paramedics) and physicians from civil liability resulting
from the good faith performance of duties authorized by section 146.35(1), Wis.
Stats. and proof of continued maintenance of the necessary insurance coverage.
Id. § H20.03(1)(f):
The ambulance service provider shall be responsible for the provision of ade-
quate insurance coverage to protect ambulance attendants and for the continua-
tion of the insurance protection.
Id. § H20.03(4)(a):
The department may deny, refuse renewal of, suspend or revoke ambulance
service provider and ambulance attendant licenses for . . . failure to provide
or to maintain adequate insurance coverage to protect ambulance attendants in
the performance of emergency care procedures.
44. Wis. AD. CODE § H21.04.
45. See notes 10-12 supra.
46. WIs. CONST. art. I, § 9 reads as follows:
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as well as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment of the United States Constitution."7 The legislative over-
sight in enacting the abovementioned provision has created a
situation which can conceivably work a grievous hardship.
IMPOSMON OF A PosrrvE DUTY
As discussed above, good samaritan legislation is a re-
sponse to the lack of a common-law duty to come to another's
aid. Vermont, however, has gone far beyond the mere granting
of immunity and has imposed on all persons a general duty of
rescue.' 8 While the scope of the duty contemplated by Ver-
mont's statute is common in Europe," its existence is unprece-
dented in the United States. 0 Vermont's duty to aid is enforced
Every person is entitled to a certain remedy in the laws for all injuries, or wrongs
which he may receive in his person, property, or character; he ought to obtain
justice freely, and without being obliged to purchase it, completely and without
denial, promptly and without delay, comformably to the laws.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 reads as follows:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
48. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 519 (1973):
(a) A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical harm
shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without danger or peril to
himself or without interfrence with important duties owed to others, give reason-
able assistance to the exposed person unless that assistance or care is being
provided by others.
(b) A person who provides reasonable assistance in compliance with
subsection (a) of this section shall not be liable in civil damages unless his acts
constitute gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to receive remu-
neration. Nothing contained in this subsection shall alter existing law with
respect to tort liability of a practitioner of the healing arts for acts committed
in the ordinary course of his practice.
(c) A person who willfully violates subsection (a) of this section shall be
fined not more than $100.00.
49. See Comment, The Duty to Rescue the Good Samaritan, 71 DicK. L. REv. 75,
75 n.1 (1966); Comment, Vermont Requires Rescue, 25 STAN'. L. Ray. 51, 55, 59-60
(1972); 64 COLUM. L. Rav. 1301, 1317-19 (1964); 10 WM. & MARY L. Ray. 956, 971-72
(1969).
50. Many states do have "Stop and Aid" statutes which require a driver to stop
and render aid at the scene of an accident which was caused in part by his negligence,
but these statutes are of limited scope and do not establish the general duty contem-
plated by the Vermont good samaritan statute. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 346.67(1) (1975):
The operator of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or
death of any person or in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by
1979]
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by a criminal penalty although civil sanctions may also be
available.' Although no court has yet interpreted this statute,
it is not unlikely that reliance on something more than human
sympathy may achieve more positive results than those pro-
duced by the voluntary good samaritan statutes since it can be
argued that the imposition of a statutory obligation is more
likely to be known to the community than knowledge of
changes in tort liability, which are generally confined to the
bar.
CONCLUSION
Good samaritan legislation is designed to promote an in-
creased concern for the welfare of fellow human beings by en-
couraging the voluntary rendering of assistance. It contem-
plates changing attitudes toward giving aid in emergency situ-
ations by softening the strict common-law due care require-
ment historically required of individuals who give such aid.
Ambiguities in the Wisconsin statutory language, however,
threaten to frustrate the success of the legislation. Moreover,
the expansion of the class of persons granted immunity man-
dates a closer scrutiny of the statutory language. Guidelines
should be established for taking positive action. Good faith as
the sole criterion qualifying conduct is inadequate. Other cru-
cial terms, "emergency" and "emergency care," remained
undefined. The standard of care should be more specifically
delineated; "emergency" should be phrased in terms of the
urgency of the care needed; and definite guidelines should
be established regarding the type of actions permitted in
emergency situations.
DAWN B. LIEB
any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of the accident or
as close thereto as posible but shall then forthwith return to and in every event
shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the following
requirements:
(c) He shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assis-
tance, including the carrying, or the making of arrangements for the carrying,
of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treat-
ment if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is
requested by the injured person.
51. Comment, Vermont Requires Rescue, 25 STAN. L. REV. 51, 55-57 (1972).
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